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1. Introduction: 
 
 
Since around 1750, global wealth has risen in an exponential way1
The Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain in the 18th century, is the direct 
consequence of a major invention, the steam engine. Its use in cotton mills involved a 
dramatic increase in production capacities. Thanks to the growth of productivity underpinned 
by the transformation of technology since the 18th century but also, to the trade unions, the 
working class struggles and the compromise of the dominant class – emergence of the 
Welfare State in Bismarck’s Germany and later, post-WWII Keynesianism – the standard of 
living is now spectacularly higher than in the 18th century. However, technological 
revolutions did not have only positive consequences on workforce. The Industrial Revolution 
also led to unemployment and, at the beginning, lower real wages. Although there was a slight 
improvement in standard of living over the period 1790-1840, there was “intensified 
exploitation, greater insecurity, and increasing human misery
. What made this 
possible? Capitalism, colonization, exploitation of the working class, globalization? Each of 
these phenomena might be an answer to the question, but above all, this amazing economic 
growth was due to technology. This allowed new organization of production and economic 
activity. Together technological advancement and reorganization of the production led to an 
increasing pace in productivity growth.  
2
What about the Information Revolution also called Third Industrial Revolution
 (p.212).” The new working 
class organized itself in unions and won new work and wage conditions. The cotton mill was 
“the agent not only of industrial but also of social revolution, producing not only more goods 
but also the “Labour Movement” itself. (p.192)” The Marx’s proletariat also lost struggles 
against the bourgeoisie but the class consciousness was growing and new political thoughts 
emerged. 
3
                                                 
1 Beinhocker, Eric D. The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics. 
Boston: Harvard Business School P, 2006. 
, 
whose macroeconomic effects of diffusion were felt essentially since the end of the 1970s? 
Like the steam engine during the First Industrial Revolution, the Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) has completely changed the way society organizes its 
economic activity. While the 18th or 19th century’s machines replaced the manufacturing 
2 Thompson, Edward P. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage Books, 1966. 
3 Cf. section 2. 
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worker, the new “thinking machines” have been “increasingly capable of performing 
conceptual, managerial, and administrative functions and of coordinating the flow of 
production, from extraction of raw materials to the marketing and distribution of final goods 
and services1 (p.60).” This new computer-based automation has led to a major decline of the 
global labor force, whether in the manufacturing sector or in the newly evolved service sector, 
which had been absorbing for more than forty years the job losses in the manufacturing 
sector. What John Maynard Keynes already called “technological unemployment” in The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, is now facing the entire society. As 
Peter Drucker argues, in the new economic order, the knowledge has displaced the labor and 
the capital as the key factor of production. While millions of low-skilled workers and an 
increasing number of suburban middle-income wage earners feel the bite of re-engineering 
and the impact of technological displacement, a small elite of knowledge workers, 
entrepreneurs and corporate managers reap the benefits of the high-tech global economy. This 
new social order in which inequality is based on knowledge represents a major challenge.2 
The knowledge society leads to important employment and social issues. Re-engineering, 
automation, outsourcing and offshoring have led to unemployment, underemployment and 
temporary work for the blue-collars, the African-Americans in the US or the suburbs’ 
inhabitants in France3
The education system, the social contract, the income redistribution, the working time 
and the whole role of state have to be rethought in order to take on the challenge of the 
knowledge-based society in a high-tech global economy. 
 and globally all low-skilled workers. The reorganization of production 
is now also threatening the most important political group in developed countries – the middle 
class. Job insecurity leads to big issues in terms of social cohesion, violence and crime. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the consequences of technology on the 
workforce in terms of income, employment and standard of living. It would be also interesting 
to study how the labor force struggles to take advantage of industrial revolutions and how it 
self-organizes. First, we will look closely at the current situation and the consequences of the 
Information Age on the workforce. Then, we will examine the First Industrial Revolution and 
the evolution of the working class condition during it. All of these should lead us to find the 
similarities and the differences between both technological revolutions and possible solutions 
                                                 
1 Rifkin, Jeremy. The End of Work. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2004. 
2 Drucker, Peter F. "The Age of Social Transformation." The Atlantic Monthly Nov. 1994: 53-80. 
3 The French translation of the suburbs, “la banlieue”, often does not refer to the upmarket areas of the city but to 
the impoverished suburban areas on the outskirts of some cities. These neighbourhoods are frequently associated 
with social problems such as delinquency, unemployment and unrest. 
Mathias Humbert                                                                              Technology and Workforce 
 4 
for the 21st century social challenges. It would be interesting to speak briefly about the 
different transformations of technology between the 18th and the 21st century. Also we will 
look at the economic waves and industrial revolutions in order to connect through time the 
Information Revolution with the First Industrial Revolution and emphasize the role of the 
trends and the waves in the economic growth and capitalist development. 
 
 
 
2. Technological transformation, waves and industrial revolutions 
 
 
First of all, it is useful to give a concise definition of the First Industrial Revolution: it 
is the “transformation of technology based on new sources of power, the revamping of 
economic and labor organization through the factory system, and the ascendancy of 
manufacturing in what had been predominantly agricultural economies1
                                                 
1 Stearns, Peter N. Interpreting the Industrial Revolution. Washington: American Historical Association, 1991. 
 (p.4).” When we 
generally think about the Industrial Revolution, we think of the one which began around 
1760-1770 in Britain. But there is more than one industrial revolution. We can actually see 
three industrial revolutions since the 18th century, but before broaching this subject, it is 
important to look at the thoughts of two economists, Nikolai Kondratiev and Joseph 
Schumpeter. They made a wonderful contribution to economic history with their long wave 
theories. Nikolai Kondratiev first argued that the capitalist development was made of long 
waves, named by Schumpeter “Kondratiev waves”. These waves are 45-60 years long and 
represent one cycle of global economic growth. They are successive sine curves highly linked 
to innovations. According to his theory, we are currently in the 5th Kondratiev wave, the 
Information Technology one. The first era was led up by the steam engine, the second by 
railways and steel, the third by electrical engineering and chemistry, and the fourth by 
petrochemicals and automobiles. In his theory, he also divides each economic cycle in four 
periods: prosperity, recession, depression and improvement. Before Kondratiev, Clarke, 
Jevons, Marx, and Engels have already all emphasized the same point. They “all witnessed 
periods of unrest, economic turbulence, and great famines in the midst of overproduction and 
plenty. And they noticed the regularity of these ups and downs, as well as the great structural 
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changes that accompanied capitalist development1 (p.73).” Taking up the thought of 
Kondratiev, Joseph Schumpeter showed the importance of history’s role in understanding 
capitalism. For Schumpeter, the process of capitalist development should be explained by a 
different phenomenon than equilibrium: by an “industrial mutation … that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about 
capitalism2 (p.83).” The five Schumpeterian long waves are: the Industrial Revolution (1771), 
the age of steam and railways (1829), the age of steel, electrical and heavy engineering 
(1875), the age of oil, automobile and mass production (1908) and the age of information and 
telecommunications (1971). For Schumpeter, the growth is driven by innovation: it is a 
cyclical co-evolution of technology, business models and institutions. However, some 
historians, like von Tunzelmann or Chandler, prefer to bring together the first and second 
Kondratiev waves as the “First Industrial Revolution”, the third and fourth ones as the 
“Second Industrial Revolution” and the present one, the Information Revolution, as the “Third 
Industrial Revolution”. Incidentally, Jeremy Rifkin uses this term in The End of Work
 
. 
 
 
3. The social issues of the Information Revolution 
 
 
In the 1970s, the developed world entered into a new age, one of information. Since 
then, the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has totally changed our way of 
life, leisure and our means of communication and information. Internet is obviously the best 
example of this technological revolution. But, as we will see, the Information Technology has 
had even more repercussion on the organization of the production and on the labor market, 
resulting in tremendous consequences on the workforce of developed countries. The ICT 
combined with the refashioning of the state, the Reagan-Thatcher years, the economic 
deregulation and the globalization made an explosive combination in terms of social issues. 
                                                 
1 Freeman, Chris, and Francisco Louçã. As Time Goes By. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. 
2 Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Unwin University Books, 1974. 
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Before dealing with the social consequences of the Information Age, it would be 
interesting to briefly look at the characteristics of the Information Age businesses1
Let’s look now at the crucial element for the workforce: employment. In fact, it is 
more useful to first look at unemployment. The main problem with official unemployment 
statistics is that it does not account for all unemployed workers. The unemployment rate of 
the United States, 4.7 percent in November 2007
 (p.10). 
First, mass production became mass customization in the Information Age. IT and 
information tools are key elements that make mass customization feasible. In the Industrial 
Age, labor served the machines. In the Information Age, technology serves the workers. 
Nowadays, the labor applies knowledge instead of performing repetitive tasks. Whereas 
Industrial Age businesses were based on command and control structure, information age 
businesses use common control structure. Finally, the most important asset and the key 
driving economic input in the Information Age is knowledge, not capital.  
2, does not take into account the millions of 
discouraged workers3 or underemployed people. In France, the official rate was 8.6 percent at 
the end of 2006: The French magazine “Marianne” annually publishes an unofficial 
unemployment rate, which in 2006 was around 18 percent4
In 1900, 36 percent of the Americans worked on a farm. They are currently less than 3 
percent. During the first half of the 20th century, the manufacturing sector absorbed the 
majority of the useless farmers. In 1960, the blue-collars represented 34 percent of the U.S. 
labor force. This rate dropped to 16 percent in 1997 and it might be as little as 5 percent by 
! Instead of the official 2.1 million 
unemployed people, the magazine counted 4.4 million people, including the “hidden” 
unemployed workers. In the United States, after the 1989-1992 recession, millions of 
“discouraged workers simply gave up and dropped out of the workforce and therefore were no 
longer counted in the official statistics. Many others were incarcerated. In 1980, the prison 
population stood at 503,000 inmates. By the year 2000, nearly two million people were in 
prison (Rifkin: p.xii).” Hence, we will rather look at the global trends in every big sector of 
activity; particularly the reorganization of production in the manufacturing and service 
sectors, and its resulting layoffs. In order to better understand the current transformations in 
production, it is useful to open a historical parenthesis.  
                                                 
1 Tjaden, Gary S. "Measuring Information Age Business." The Information Revolution. Ed. Alan L. Porter and 
William H. Read. London: Ablex Corporation, 1998. 3-21. 
2 US departement of labor <www.bls.gov>. 
3 According to Jeremy Rifkin, they were 4.4 million in the U.S. in 2003 (Rifkin: p.xvii). 
4 "Baromètre du chômage." Marianne 10 Feb. 2007. 
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20201
The first example is in the automobile industry, which in the U.S. provides one out of 
twelve manufacturing jobs. All automakers are re-engineering their production to increase 
productivity and thus eliminating jobs. At the end of 2005, General Motors announced that it 
would cut 30,000 jobs in North America by the end of 2008.
 (p.237). It is the third big economic sector of the 20th century, the service sector, that 
took over the manufacturing jobless. The services are currently employing four workers out of 
five. But now, even this economic sector, thanks to technological advancement, needs less 
and less of a labor force to run. Actually, the emerging knowledge sector seems to be the only 
one able to provide new jobs. One of the big challenges for the 21st century’s society is that 
these jobs need high-skilled workers with high educational background. In order to show the 
evolution of the three traditional economic sectors, especially manufacturing and services, we 
will provide a few examples.  
2 Between 1978 and 1993, GM 
had already eliminated 250,000 jobs3
What about the service sector where the majority of workforce is currently employed? 
This sector includes a lot of areas of activity: from retail to insurance, from transport to 
education, from healthcare to tourism and restaurants. During the 20th century, this sector 
. As Jeremy Rifkin argues, “Robots are becoming 
increasingly attractive as a cost-cutting alternative to human labor on the automobile 
assembly line. The Japanese, far ahead of other automakers, have robotized much of their 
production lines (Rifkin: p.131).” With new thinking machines, intelligent robots, 
programming language, voice communication, the need for workers in automobile plants will 
dramatically decrease in the 21st century. Another example of this obvious trend can be found 
in the steel industry, which has been a leading sector of the industrialization process and has 
provided millions of jobs to workers in developed countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
This industrial sector is currently eliminating more and more jobs by introducing automation 
and information technologies. “According to the International Labor Organization, finished 
steel output from 1974 to 1989 dropped only 6 percent in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries while employment fell by more than 50 
percent. More than one million jobs were lost in the steel industry in OECD nations during 
this fifteen-year period (p.135).” Finally, according to a study published in November 2003 
by Alliance Capital Management, 31 million manufacturing jobs were eliminated between 
1995 and 2002 in the world’s twenty largest economies.  
                                                 
1 Porter, Alan L., and Ann Bostrom. "Less Labor, Longer Lives: Time to Share." The Information Revolution. 
Ed. Alan L. Porter and William H. Read. London: Ablex Corporation, 1998. 237-257. 
2 <http://money.cnn.com/2005/11/21/news/fortune500/gm_cuts/index.htm>. 
3 "GM Drive to Step Up Efficiency is Colliding with UAW Job Fears." Wall Street Journal 23 June 1993. 
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increased enormously to become the first economic sector in terms of employment. Nobody 
seriously thought that the service’s jobs would be threatened by the displacing-labor 
technology. However, in the telephone industry, employment declined by 179,800 between 
1981 and 1988 (p.142). In the postal service, more and more sophisticated machines became 
able to read addresses on letters and automatically sort them, much faster than traditional 
workers. Automation and computerization are just beginning in the service sector and we can 
predict that re-engineering and reorganization of the production will spread during the 21st 
century, creating many new layoffs. The wholesale and retail sectors have already been 
affected by the automation revolution. According to Jeremy Rifkin, “Electronic shipping is 
only a small part of the revolutionary changes taking place in retailing. Electronic shopping is 
also quickly penetrating the retail market, threatening the jobs of tens of thousands of sales 
clerks, managers, stock personnel, maintenance crews, security guards, and others who make 
up the retail employment complex (p.156).” For the moment, the only sector where new jobs 
are available is the knowledge sector. But for unskilled or even skilled blue and white-collar 
workers, the retraining is naive because of a weak educational background. One third of 
American adults is “functionally, marginally, or completely illiterate (p.37).”  
In addition to unemployment, American workers are affected by underemployment. In 
November 2007, the work week for production and nonsupervisory workers was around 
thirty-four hours.1
                                                 
1 US departement of labor <www.bls.gov>. 
 It clearly means that many employed people are underemployed. “In mid-
2003, more than 4.8 million Americans wanted full-time work but were only able to find part-
time employment (Rifkin: p.xvi).” On the other hand, the real wages in France and in the 
United States have also been declining at the beginning of the century, especially for low-
skilled jobs. All of these changes in employment have consequences on consumer demand 
and economic growth as well. If workers lose their jobs, are underemployed or if wages do 
not increase enough to keep up with inflation, workers cannot continue consuming or only by 
using consumer credit. Jeremy Rifkin argues that “what’s continuing to keep the American 
economy afloat is consumer debt (p. xvi).” The same increasing consumer credit happened 
just before the Wall Street Crash of 1929… Most economic and political leaders thought that 
the Information Age would have, as the previous ages, beneficial effects on workforce. The 
“trickle-down technology” which has applied for more than a century does not seem to work 
anymore. Jean-Baptiste Say, who argued that supply creates its own demand, was the first 
economist to theorize the technological trickle-down effect. Later, the neoclassical economists 
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argued that technological advancement increases productivity, allowing production of goods 
at a cheaper cost per unit. These lower prices would stimulate the consumer demand, which 
would itself in turn lead to additional production, creating a virtuous cycle of bigger 
production and consumption. Thus the initial layoffs due to technological advancement would 
be compensated by additional hiring to satisfy the higher consumer demand. Moreover, 
thanks to lower prices, consumers would have extra money to buy other products, which 
would stimulate production and employment in other parts of the economy (p.16). 
Unfortunately, the current working people of developed countries do not really feel this 
trickle-down technology. The only element which allows Americans to keep consuming is 
actually consumer credit. Indeed, with the end of the Welfare State, the new financial 
capitalism, higher and higher expected return on investment, the enterprises continually have 
to increase their profit margins. Karl Marx had already seen this underlying trend of 
capitalism when he published the Capital. He argued that the main producer’s objective was 
to reduce labor costs and displace workers with capital equipment in order to get greater 
control over the means of production. Nowadays, with more and more market pressure on 
corporations, greater expectation of stockholders, pension funds and so on, the “wild” 
capitalism that Karl Marx was talking about 150 years before is facing the 21st century’s labor 
force. Until the 1970s, the market economy has had positive impact on social conditions of 
the workforce. However, since then, social benefits gained by workers during the Keynesian 
area, have been shrinking. Jeremy Rifkin gives us relevant figures: “In 1979 the average 
weekly wage in the United States was $387. By 1989 it had dropped to $335. In the twenty-
year period from 1973 to 1993, American blue-collar employees lost 15 percent of their 
buying power (p.168).” Adding to the new financial trend, the labor-displacing information 
technologies have increased misery among a important portion of workers. The inequalities 
are growing in all developed countries. As the wealth distribution remained quiet stable in the 
United States between 1963 and 1983, the income gap between the richest people and the 
workers have tremendously increased since the 1980’s. Rifkin also underlines the huge gap 
between “a small cosmopolitan elite” and “increasingly impoverished workers and 
unemployed persons (p.173).” Finally, the Information Age is facing the growth of the new 
knowledge class, made of workers able – thanks to their better education - to take advantage 
of the new high-tech economy. 
The current social transformation has terrible consequences on the workforce. The 
situation of the African-Americans and of the suburbs’ inhabitants in France is a fine example 
of the social problems led to by unemployment, discrimination and poverty. The poverty rate 
Mathias Humbert                                                                              Technology and Workforce 
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of African-Americans, which exceeded 33 percent in the early 1990s, was still more than 24 
percent in 20061. The black community was hit the worst by the deindustrialization in the 
United States. When the Big Three auto companies began to lay off workers because of 
automation, African-Americans, who represented the bulk of unskilled workers, were the first 
to lose their jobs. As Jeremy Rifkin argues, “Permanent joblessness has led to an escalating 
crime wave in the streets of America’s cities and the wholesale disintegration of black family 
life (Rifkin: p.77).” In France, the situation for the immigrant people living in the suburbs of 
Paris or other cities is not better than in America. We can remember the French civil unrest of 
November 2005 when the whole country was “burning”. It was the consequence of years of 
unemployment and misery. In November 2007, young suburb’s inhabitants were rioting 
again, after the death of two young men. Christian Delorme, a priest in the suburbs of Lyon, 
answered to a journalist’s question; the meaning of the current revolts was the consequence of 
much suffering. He was shocked that the media and the politicians never talked about the 
huge unemployment suffered since the 1980s by the suburban population. He said that “The 
young people could legitimately believe that they were able to find a job twenty-four years 
ago. The despair was not the same as nowadays. … The unemployment and the 
discriminations made them lose the confidence2.” The French sociologist Loic Wacquant, 
Professor at UC Berkeley, studied both the “black ghetto” in the U.S. and the “working class 
banlieues” in France. He remarked the advanced marginality of a new “underclass” in the 
ghettos. After the Keynesian area, the ghettos have been transformed by unemployment and 
life deterioration. According to him, “For the residents of flagging working class areas, the 
reorganization of capitalist economies – visible in the shift from manufacturing to education-
intensive services, the impact of electronic and automation technologies in factories and 
offices, and the erosion of unions … have translated into unusually high rates of long-term 
joblessness and a regression of material conditions3
                                                 
1 US Census Bureau <www.census.gov>. 
 (p.10).” He questioned the refashioning 
of the state and the penal treatment to urban marginality. There is undoubtedly a correlation 
between job insecurity, unemployment and crime. A study also “showed a striking correlation 
between growing wage inequality and increased criminal activity (Rifkin: p.208).” While, in 
2 « Une haine née contre une accumulation de souffrances. Je suis frappé de constater que, dans le traitement 
médiatique et politique, jamais il n'est fait allusion au fait que nous sommes en présence de populations qui 
subissent un chômage massif depuis un quart de siècle. Il y a vingt-quatre ans, les jeunes pouvaient légitimement 
croire qu'ils allaient trouver du travail. La désespérance n'était pas la même. Lors de la marche, ils faisaient 
référence aux valeurs de la République. Le chômage et les discriminations ont eu raison de leur confiance. » 
"Trente ans de désespérance en banlieue." Le Monde 08 Dec. 2007. 
 <http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3224,36-987383@51-982356,0.html>. 
3 Wacquant, Loic. "When Cities Run Riot." UNESCO Courier Feb. 1993. 
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the 1950s, workers had long-term employment, pensions, and promotions in the same 
enterprise for their all lives, they are now in a global workplace where unemployment, 
underemployment and temps are daily. In addition, the end of the Welfare State, of the 
“collective worker”, and the emergence of “desocialized wage labor” have drastically 
changed the life of the former working class. 
To conclude this section about the social issues of the Information Age, it would be 
very interesting to approach the labor unions and their main weapon: the strike. As we will 
later see, at the beginning of the First Industrial Revolution, the unions did not exist at all. The 
workforce condition was awful. However, the labor movement gradually grew up, trade 
unions appeared and different social movements arose during the 19th century: The working 
class was organizing itself. In the 20th century, unions had an uneven development. We must 
remark here that the labor movement progressed during the post-WWII Keynesian area. This 
progress stopped around the midst of 1970s and the union membership declined until now. In 
2006, 12 percent of workers were union members in the United States.1 France has one of the 
lowest rates, only 8 percent. Two examples well illustrate the trend at the end of the 20th 
century. The first one took place in Britain, the cradle of unionism’s country. On January 1st 
1995 ended a very long strike that had begun on July 1986. About thirty workers of the 
Keentons Sons Company picketed in order to protest against their layoffs while workforce 
was lacking. The picket has been lifted without any result and the strikers’ delegate declared: 
“Fifty years have been necessary to our forebears to set unions up. No more than fifteen have 
been necessary to destroy them.” This quotation was obviously referring to the Thatcher 
years2. The second example is very symbolic. It shows us how technology can be used against 
the workforce nowadays, in the simplest possible manner… In September 1995, Detroit, one 
of the last American unionism’s stronghold, was witness to angry strikers who were blocking 
the entrance of a building in order to stop trucks from coming in. In order to skirt the strike, 
the management merely decided to helicopter the factory’s production above the strikers’ 
heads. This story tells us a lot about the situation: workers using struggle methods of the 
1930’s outclassed by the modern technology3
                                                 
1 US departement of labor <www.bls.gov>. 
 (p.69). These two symbolic examples highlight 
the current defeat of the former working class. An American striker also said: “We have 
forgotten our historical heritage; we have forgotten to teach it to our children. We are paying 
the price now. We are struggling for the eight-hour day again!” Another union activist added: 
2 Bairoch, Paul. Victoires et déboires. Vol. III. Paris: Gallimard, 1997. 
3 Frank, Thomas C., and David Mulcahey. "L'envers du miracle économique américain." Manière de voir Oct.-
Nov. 2007: 68-70. 
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“We have made so many concessions that we have forgotten what we learnt during the 
1930’s. Everything has been conquered, not given. We must struggle from now on. The 
American middle class will otherwise disappear (p.70).” The current weak position of the 
trade unions may be one of the reasons of the decreasing workforce condition in the 
Information Age. According to Rifkin, “shorter workweeks and increased wages could have 
been tied to increases in productivity. Instead, labor capitulated (Rifkin: p.86).” Strong and 
resolute trade unions are of primary importance to gain better life conditions, higher wages 
and job security. Marx’s class struggle needs human beings to fight, and above all, the 
workers must have a “class consciousness”. We will see that the working class had to struggle 
during the 19th century to benefit from the productivity gains. 
 
 
 
4. The social consequences of the First Industrial Revolution 
 
 
We will follow the same approach we took for the Information Revolution to study the 
First Industrial Revolution. We will then begin to see how the material condition of the 
workforce essentially that of its new emerging component – the working class – changed 
during this industrial revolution and soon after. It means we will attempt to evaluate the 
evolution of the standard of living, of the real wages and unemployment. Then, as in the 
previous section, we will see how the working class experienced its new condition, its new 
social and political status and how it organized itself to exploit its numerical power and get 
better living conditions. 
The Industrial Revolution began in Britain around 1760-1770. The emergence of the 
water-powered followed by steam-powered mechanization, of the cotton mills drastically 
changed the economic and social world course. The Industrial Revolution and the French 
Revolution of 1789, what Hobsbawm called the “dual revolution”1
                                                 
1 Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Revolution. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962. 
, together transformed the 
world. The Industrial Revolution had enormous consequences on the production of goods 
since it led to the continual process of increased productivity. The First Industrial Revolution 
was the starting point of a virtuous economic cycle that increased the wealth of developed 
countries in an exponential way. However, we should wonder how this higher wealth has 
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been distributed at the beginning of the industrialization process, how the mill workers were 
living during the Industrial Revolution, and how this tremendous revolution in production 
influence the economic and social condition of the labor force. 
We will so start by examining the material consequences that the Industrial Revolution 
had on the new working class. The standard of living is the element which best represents the 
economic condition of the labor force during the end of the 18th century and the beginning of 
the 19th. Did this standard of living increase or not during the industrialization process? It has 
been and still is a tremendous debate between historians. “Optimists” think that it increased, 
at least since the 1840s and “pessimists” such as Hobsbawm, highlight the increasing misery 
of workers during the industrialization and definitely exclude an improvement before 1844. 
Eric Hobsbawm, a “pessimist”, prefers to show the growing inequality when he says that “the 
gap between the rich and the poor certainly grew wider and more visible” (p.206). The long 
days of work in the factory were almost slavery and the wages were, at least until 1840, just 
enough to survive and to keep creating the surplus value1. The new working man was 
certainly less free than the former serf. He had to work for longer hours than the peasants, 
until sixteen hours a day during the beginning of the Industrial Revolution2 (p.620). 
Moreover, the “new factory proletariat” was “under the strict control and the even stricter 
discipline imposed by the master or his supervisors, against whom they had virtually no legal 
recourse and only the very beginnings of public protection” (Hobsbawm: p.208). In The 
Making of the Working Class
                                                 
1 This exploitation was very beneficial to the industrialization process and the economic growth of capitalist 
countries.  
, Thompson notices the controversy on the standard of living 
and the “ideological muddle” (Thompson: p.207). He attempts to do his own analysis. He 
claims that the condition of the majority did not get better between 1790 and 1830. However, 
during the union’s awesome period of 1832-1834, he catches sight of increasing real wages 
among organised workers. The workforce good time was very short because trade unions 
were beaten down as soon as 1833 until 1837, and the following four years were depressive 
for the economy. As Thompson says, the half a century following the very beginning of 
Industrial Revolution was not a success story. After almost eighty years of the 
industrialization process, the British standard of living still was at the point of subsistence 
(p.209). He concludes his analysis with two relevant affirmations. First, he notices “a slight 
improvement in average material standards” over the period 1790-1840. However, there was, 
at the same time, “intensified exploitation, greater insecurity, and increasing human misery”. 
2 Bairoch, Paul. Victoires et déboires. Vol. I. Paris: Gallimard, 1997. 
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While most workers were “better off than their 1790s forerunners”, the small increase in 
material condition was suffered as “a catastrophic experience (p.212).” 
We will show now that work issues we have seen about the Information Age could be 
already found in the 19th century. Such phenomena as laborsaving technologies or 
unemployment are not new and actually appeared, or at least increased in the First Industrial 
Revolution. In The Condition of the Working Class in England1, Engels shows in a brilliant 
way, using many statistical measurements, how machinery and technical innovations had 
displaced the human work in textile manufacturing. He already noticed that “every 
improvement in machinery leads to unemployment (p.151).” Engels also disproves the 
“trickle-down technology” argument. According to him, as to Jeremy Rifkin, this 
phenomenon cannot by itself solve the unemployment challenge caused by technological 
advancement and automation. On the other hand, Hobsbawn has been able to show that 
unemployment rates could reach 20-30 percent in the main industrial districts of Lancashire 
and Yorkshire during the depression years (Freeman: p.185). Like now, unemployment could 
last for more than a year in 1841-18422
 
. However, since unemployment compensation did not 
exist yet, the new unemployed man’s situation was worse than today. Moreover, the workers 
persistently claimed that improved machinery led to wage reductions, although the 
bourgeoisie denied it (Engels: p.154). These unemployment and wage problems remind us the 
current situation. The current decreasing income of a large part of the low-skilled workforce 
leads to a decrease in consumption. This under-consumption had already been theorized in 
1817 by the Leicester framework-knitters as “an under-consumption theory of capitalist crisis:  
That in proportion as the Reduction of Wages makes the great Body of the 
People poor and wretched, in the same proportion must the consumption of 
our manufactures be lessened. That if liberal Wages were given to the 
Mechanics in general throughout the Country, the Home Consumption of our 
Manufactures would be immediately more than doubled, and consequently 
every hand would soon find full employment (Thompson: p.206).”  
 
The social consequences on the working class condition, such as unemployment, exploitation, 
the sixteen-hour workday and in general very hard work conditions in the plants led to 
discontent and misery. The labouring poor were ready for the revolution… 
                                                 
1 Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. 
2 Hobsbawn, Eric J. Labouring Men. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964. 
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The new economic order which led to a growing income gap between the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie was at the root of the revolutions of 1848. Moreover, as Marx argues, 
“with the development of industry, the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes 
concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more1 (p.17).” 
Indeed, as the working class made up 20-25 percent of the working population before the 
Industrial Revolution, it accounted for around 60 percent at the end of the 19th century in 
Western Europe. Moreover, the new concentration of the workers in the mills built a 
revolutionary mass and made the class consciousness, “the working people’s consciousness of 
their interests and of their predicament as a class (Thompson: p.711)”, possible. As Marx 
argues, “the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself (p.14).”  The first 
workers’ protest against the Industrial Revolution, called Luddism, was the action of 
machine-breakers, which just attacked the new threatening machines. This social movement 
took place in England between 1811 and 1816. On the Continent, both revolts in 1831 and 
1834 of the Lyons silk-workers, the canuts, may be considered as part of the Luddite 
movement2
                                                 
1 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. Filiquarian, 2005. 
 (p.451-452). The trade unions, which rose up around the early 1830s in Britain, 
were the result of the need for the permanent mobilization of the working class. As Hobsbawn 
highlights, “A decent livelihood could not be achieved merely by occasional protest which 
served to restore the stable but temporarily disturbed balance of society. It required the eternal 
vigilance, organization and activity of the “movement” – the trade union, the mutual or co-
operative society, the working-class institute, newspaper or agitation (Hobsbawn 1962: 
p.209).” Large strike movements took place during the first part of the 19th century. Since 
there was no political means to defend the workers’ interest before the Chartist movement, the 
social movement was the only one way for the workforce to gain part of the economic 
growth’s benefits. Chartism started in 1838 in Britain. The Chartists obtained millions of 
signatures between 1838 and 1848 in order to grant new political rights to the working class. 
But all petitions were rejected by Parliament and universal suffrage for men over 21, which 
was one of the most important demands, only appeared decades later, in 1918. Meanwhile, on 
the Continent, the social revolutions of 1848, the “Spring of Nations”, were brutally 
repressed. However, all of these social and revolutionary movements were not fruitless. 
Rather they were the roots of the political and economic improvements for the following 
generations. They were the beginning of the long struggle of the working class, the start of the 
great labor movement for better living and working conditions. Last but not least, new 
2 Bairoch, Paul. Victoires et déboires. Vol. II. Paris: Gallimard, 1997. 
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political thoughts, such as socialism, emerged. This new emancipation idea was growing up 
throughout the 19th century. First were the utopian socialists1
 
, such as Robert Owen in Britain 
and Saint-Simon in France. In 1848, Marx and Engels published the Communist Manifesto 
which would have enormous consequences on 20th century’s history. Actually, the whole 
Marxist theory would have a dramatic influence on the 20th century revolutionary’s thought. 
Finally, in 1864 appeared the first International Workingmen’s Association. One hundred 
years after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the workforce was at last 
internationally organized. As a symbol, the First International was founded in London, in the 
country were Industrial Revolution was born. From then on, the working class, conscious of 
its collective power, was armed to struggle. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: 
 
 
We will conclude this study by first comparing the consequences of both industrial 
revolutions. The modern workforce’s living conditions are so much better than in the 19th 
century that it is irrelevant to compare the current standard of living with that of the First 
Industrial Revolution. For that matter, we must recognize that the industrialization process 
and its underlying dramatic economic growth have a very beneficial long-term effect on 
workers’ condition. The growth of productivity and wealth were necessary conditions, but not 
sufficient ones. The working class of the 19th and 20th centuries struggled through trade 
unions and political parties. The emerging “communist” countries all around the 20th 
century’s world and the fear of socialist revolutions might also have led to the social 
compromise, fairer distribution of wealth and the Welfare State. And we said, the comparison 
of both revolutions in terms of wages or living conditions is useless. However, we may 
compare the evolution of wages, unemployment and standard of living during these two 
transformation’s processes.  For the moment, in the developed countries, the majority of the 
workers is still employed and still has good living conditions. However, we have been 
entering in a global process of re-engineering, worldwide reorganization of production using 
new information technologies and the automation to lay off developed countries’ workers in 
                                                 
1 Term introduced by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. 
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order to reduce labor cost and thus increase the profit margins and the stockholders’ 
dividends. We can already see the social consequences of this new economic order. The most 
vulnerable people are the youth, the low-skilled workers, the African-Americans in the United 
States or the poor suburban inhabitants in France. The new urban underclass is growing up 
and leads to dramatic consequences on social cohesion and security. In a world where 
automation is putting more and more workers in the manufacturing and services sectors out of 
a job, the Workfare State has created a new urban marginality. According to Loic Wacquant, 
a new class, the “precariat”1 is emerging. The trinity of “sans”, job-less, home-less and paper-
less migrants2 are also leading to enormous social challenges. As Wacquant argues, the great 
dilemma is how to organize the precariat. We should add that the great challenge for the labor 
force as a whole is how to reorganize itself to gain a portion of the Information Age’s 
economic profits, and also, how to build new global solidarity between workers of China, 
Brazil, Germany, India, Canada and so on. As we have already seen, it is the union of all 
workers and their struggles which compelled the upper classes to make concessions. Finally, 
we must realize that labor has totally changed. Thanks to automation, almost all 
manufacturing production is done without workers, and services need less and less workforce. 
The knowledge sector will remain the only one to need human intelligence; at least until the 
thinking machines are intelligent enough to displace the knowledge workers. Our society’s 
challenge is thus to educate people in order to have high-skilled workers. This requires a 
remaking of the education policy. For the other workers, as Rifkin suggests, the development 
of the social sector or the reduction of the work week3
 
 are possible solutions. The sharing of   
productivity gains and the redefinition of the social contract might also bring down the 
increasing poverty and the precariousness. The actual issue is how we want the production 
gains of the Information Revolution be distributed, how we want the coming world be. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Precariat is a mix of proletariat and precariousness. 
2 <http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/wacquant/wacquant_pdf/LW-TERRITORIALSTIGMAGEADVMARG-
Proofs.pdf> 
3 We must remember that the work week, which lasted more than 80 hours at the beginning of the First Industrial 
Revolution, decreased to 60 and then 40 hours with the advancement of technology and the Second Industrial 
Revolution. The French reduction of the work week from 39 to 35 hours, introduced by the government of 
Lionel Jospin had good consequences in terms of unemployment and leisure. However, Nicolas Sarkosy, the 
new French President wants to cancel, or at least to “adapt”, this social measure. 
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